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Abstract
This experiment explores whether individuals know that other people are biased. We
conﬁrm that overestimation of abilities is a pervasive problem, but observe that most
people are not aware of it, i.e. they think others are unbiased. We investigate several
explanations for this result. As a ﬁrst one, we discuss a possible unfamiliarity with the
task and the subjects’ inability to distinguish between random mistakes and a real bias.
Second, we show how the relation between a subject’s belief about others and his belief
about himself might be driven by a false consensus eﬀect or self-correction mechanism.
Third, we identify a self-serving bias when comparing how a subject evaluates his own
and other people’s biases.
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11 Introduction
Biased individuals act diﬀerently from unbiased individuals. There are innumerable exam-
ples for this. For instance, having overly optimistic expectations about the future or the
environment results in acting against long odds when choosing an investment strategy, mak-
ing insurance choices, or entering a new market. One major reason for traﬃc accidents is
that people overestimate their driving abilities. CEOs, who overestimate their success prob-
ability, may agree too often to a merger. Overestimation of one’s (relative) abilities can lead
to wrong job application or search behavior in the labor market.
When interacting with other people, it thus is important to know whether they are biased to
react appropriately. Consider shareholders, who delegate to a manager the decision whether
or not to conduct a merger. If the manager overestimates the success probability of the
merger, his decision will be suboptimal for the shareholders and it might be better not to
delegate the decision to him. Also in strategic interactions between biased agents, a player’s
behavior depends on the knowledge about the bias of his opponents.1 Consider a manger’s
decision whether or not to enter a new market, where the success of entry depends on the
(relative) quality of his good and the number of competitors in the market. Excess entry
can be driven by two forces: managers overestimate the (relative) quality of their own good
and/or they do not know that their opponents are overconﬁdent. These two forces are, how-
ever, hard to disentangle and it might not be clear what drives excess entry. Thus, in this
experiment, we want to abstract from all kinds of strategic interactions and ask in a simple
decision problem whether people know that others are biased.
Our baseline experiment considers in the simplest possible setting the question whether peo-
ple know about the bias of others. In a ﬁrst treatment, subjects answered several diﬃcult –
but not tricky – multiple-choice questions and estimated how many questions they have cor-
rect. In a second treatment, we then informed subjects about the ﬁrst experiment, showed
them the questions, told them the others’ average guess about the number of correct answers
and “asked”2 whether they think the true number is roughly equal, higher or lower.
While we observe in the ﬁrst treatment that subjects overestimate their ability, subjects in
the second treatment are not aware of this. As overconﬁdence is such a prominent phe-
nomenon in the real world, this result is surprising. The aim of our extensions is to further
examine this result and understand the driving forces behind it. One possible explanation
for it is that people have no real life experience with the task and that this causes their un-
awareness of overconﬁdence. In a ﬁrst extension, we cause this familiarity by letting subjects
answer the questions and estimate their own number of correct answers before assessing the
1Theoretical models typically assume that an agent knows that (a proportion of) his opponents are biased.
2We should mention here that we never asked subjects directly, nor did we use words like bias, or
overestimation, but implemented simple decision problems to elicit beliefs.
1others. While now more subjects recognize that others are overconﬁdent, still the majority
thinks that they are unbiased. In a second extension, we try to further increase the subjects’
familiarity – by writing the instructions in a non-neutral way using words like over- and un-
derestimation. Our result shows that this helps to make subjects recognize that others are
biased, but not that they are overconﬁdent. Lastly, we let subjects evaluate other subjects
who answered tricky questions. Before the evaluation, we showed them the correct answers.
This strong signal ﬁnally helped to make subjects recognize that others are overconﬁdent,
however, they still do not recognize the full extent of the overconﬁdence bias.
These observations indicate that people are not fully aware that others are on average over-
conﬁdent. What do they think about single subjects? Do they think an individual makes
mistakes when evaluating her number of correct answers? Do they think these mistakes are
just random or that they mirror a real bias? For this we ask subjects about a single other
subject. And indeed, they notice that a single subject’s self-assessment can be wrong. We
show that “wrong” for them means that the other subject makes a random mistake, but
has no bias. Thus, they think not only the average of subjects is unbiased, but also single
subjects are.
As in all these extension subjects answer the questions and evaluate themselves, they provide
us furthermore with the opportunity to examine how the belief about others is shaped by
the subjects’ beliefs about themselves. First, we ﬁnd evidence for a false consensus eﬀect,
i.e. subjects adjust their belief about others in the direction of their own belief. Moreover,
subjects think that others, who are more similar to them, are more likely to be correct.
Second, we observe a self-correction mechanism: For example, those subjects, who recognize
that others are overconﬁdent, are underconﬁdent themselves. It is likely that – being aware
of the overconﬁdence problem – they adjust their belief about themselves too heavily – which
results in own underconﬁdence.
The aim of our last extension is to deepen the understanding what people know about biases.
When overconﬁdent agents interact with each other, it is not only important that they know
about the bias of their opponent, but also about the relation between their own bias and the
one of their opponent. To examine this, we let subjects (in all mentioned extensions) make
an additional choice that reveals their beliefs about the relation of their own bias/mistake
and the average bias of the others. Concerning these relative biases, the largest group of
subjects thinks that they are themselves more likely to judge their ability correctly than is
the average population. The result is consistent with a self-serving bias. Still it is surprising
because “the others” represent an average: If one believes that people are unbiased, mis-
takes should cancel out on average, but not for a single subject. Thus, while subjects are
aware that others make mistakes, they seem not to be aware that they can make mistakes
themselves.
2Much of the evidence for overconﬁdence comes from calibration studies by psychologists,
in which subjects make probability judgements. People’s conﬁdence often exceeds their
actual accuracy (for a review of this literature see Yates, 1990). Besides being poorly cali-
brated, people also state conﬁdence intervals that are too narrow. There are also experiments
by economists who conﬁrm that individuals are overconﬁdent (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999;
Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005). In Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) market entry game, people’s
behavior might not only be driven by their overconﬁdence, but also by their belief about the
bias of others – something which is, however, hard to disentangle in their experiment.
There are only few papers that deal with the knowledge about biases. One strand considers
time inconsistent preferences: People behave diﬀerently depending on whether they do or do
not know that they behave inconsistently over time (for theoretical models see e.g. Laibson
(1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), for a ﬁeld study where time inconsistent preferences
matter see Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006)). Another strand examines the behavior of
individuals in so-called beauty contests (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; Ho et al., 1998). In
these games, the strategy of a player depends on how rational he thinks that his opponents
are, i.e. how many steps of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies they are able
to perform. Finally, several theoretical papers – that ask about the behavior of overconﬁdent
agents in economic situations – assume that individuals know that others are biased. We
discuss these papers in Section 6.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our baseline experiment, which
consists of two treatments (Treatment A and B). This baseline experiment answers our very
basic question whether people are aware that other people are biased. We then introduce
the three extensions of our baseline experiment: we make subjects more familiar with the
task (Treatments Q and W, which we describe in Section 3), we distinguish between random
mistakes and biases (Treatment S, described in Section 4), and ﬁnally, we ask what people
think about the relation between their own and other peoples’ bias (Section 5). In Section
6, we discuss how to deal with one possible drawback of our experiment (the selection of
questions), the procedure to measure the subjects’ biases, and applications of our results to
organizations and markets. In Section 7, we conclude.
2 Baseline Treatments: Do You Know That Others
Have a Bias?
We conducted the computerized experiment at the University of Bonn. We programmed the
experiment with the software z-Tree Fischbacher (1999) and recruited subjects via the inter-
net by using the software ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments)
developed by Greiner (2004). A total of 116 subjects participated in six treatments (with
317 to 20 participants each). Each subject participated in only one of the treatments. Before
the experiment started, we read out loudly the instructions3 and the subjects answered clar-
ifying questions to make sure that they understand the experimental procedure. We kept
the wording of all but one instructions (see later) neutral to avoid framing eﬀects: We did
not use terms like self-assessment, ability, or overconﬁdence – although we use them in the
following to describe the design. Subjects earned Tokens during the experiment, where 210
Tokens = 1 Euro. Average hourly earnings were 8 Euros.
2.1 Experimental Design
To address our main question whether people know about the overconﬁdence bias of others,
we conducted two treatments, A and B. In Treatment A, 20 subjects (“A subject” or “she”)
answered multiple-choice questions and estimated their number of correct answers. In treat-
ment B, we asked 20 other subjects (“B subject” or “he”) whether they think that the A
subjects estimated their number of correct answers on average correctly or not. This means
that we deﬁne the bias of the A subjects as the average diﬀerence between their estimated
and true number of correct answers. In contrast, from observing that a single A subject’s
true and estimated number diverge, one cannot say whether she is really biased or makes a
random mistake.
2.1.1 Treatment A
Treatment A consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, 20 A subjects answer seven diﬃcult
multiple-choice questions from diﬀerent ﬁelds of general knowledge. Questions are such that
a subject should know the answer more or less for sure or not at all. We paid subjects 190
Tokens for each correct answer. In the second stage, an A subject estimates her number of
correctly answered questions without knowing her true number of them t ∈ {0,1...7}. We
denote this estimate by q ∈ {0,1...7}.
To achieve that a subject states her true belief about t, we paid her 525 tokens if q = t
and 30 else. Subjects infer these payoﬀs from Table 1. Like this we can elicit beliefs via
a neutral decision task without asking subjects directly “how many question do you think
you answered correctly” as such a question could inﬂuence their choice e.g. via self-esteem
protection channels.4
3Instructions are available upon request.
4The procedure ensures that subjects select the alternative on which they place the highest probability
(see the appendix.). In the following we just say “the A subject thinks she has x answers correct”, which
should read as “the A subject puts the highest probability on the event that she has x answers correct”.
As we later on take the average over all subjects this makes no diﬀerence: choosing x when one is roughly
indiﬀerent between x and say x − 1 and x − 1 is true is an random mistake if subjects were unbiased, i.e. it
should cancel out on average.
4Correct Answers (t)
0 1 ... 7
Action 0 525 ... 30 30
Action 1 30 525 ... 30
... ... ... ... ...
Action 7 30 30 ... 525
Table 1: Payoﬀ table to elicit belief about number of correct answers in Treatment A.
While this payoﬀ structure has the disadvantage that larger deviations are not punished
more, it ensures truth telling under very mild behavioural assumptions (“more is better”)
as we show in the appendix. In contrast, to punish larger deviations and to ensure truth
telling, one had to assume risk neutrality which is likely to be violated even for small stakes
(see e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002; Rabin, 2001). Furthermore, we wanted to make sure that
subjects do not use a hedging strategy, like answering no question in the ﬁrst stage to be
able to make the correct choice in the second stage. To circumvent this problem, we decided
to implement the following procedure: When answering the questions, an A subject knows
that she has to make a decision later on. She also knows that her payoﬀ for this decision
depends on her number of correctly answered questions but does not know yet the exact task
and the relevant payoﬀ table. This procedure is necessary as with the payoﬀ structure itself,
we could not eliminate hedging concerns completely unless we rewarded subjects much more
for a correct answer than for a right decision. This would, however, not have mirrored the
importance of the tasks.
2.1.2 Treatment B
In Treatment B, 20 subjects (“B subject” or “he”) receive in their instructions detailed
information about Treatment A: the full procedure of the experiment, the multiple-choice
questions (without indication of correct answers), and the average belief about the number
of correct questions (rounded to one decimal place), which we denote by ¯ q in the following.
Given this information, B subjects have to state whether they think that A subjects are over-
conﬁdent (meaning that ¯ q exceed the average true number of correct questions (¯ t) by more
than 0.5), underconﬁdent (¯ t − ¯ q > 0.5) or unbiased (|¯ q − ¯ t| ≤ 0.5). By adding/subtracting
0.5 we capture rounding eﬀects and small mistakes which remain on, even though A subjects
are unbiased.
Furthermore, B subjects state their belief about the exact size of ¯ t by choosing a number
z ∈ {0,0.1,0.2,...,6.9,7}. To avoid hedging possibilities, this choice has to be consistent
with the statement about the bias of the A subjects: e.g. z has to be larger than ¯ q +0.5 if a
B subject stated that the A subjects are underconﬁdent.
5Action
left middle right
¯ t < ¯ q − 0.5 315 315 1680
¯ q − 0.5 ≥ ¯ t ≤ ¯ q + 0.5 315 1680 315
¯ t > ¯ q + 0.5 1680 315 315
Table 2: Payoﬀ table to elicit the B subjects’ beliefs whether the A subjects are under- or
overconﬁdent or unbiased.
The procedure to elicit these beliefs is analogue to the one described in Section 2.1.1 and
uses Table 2: B subjects receive a high payoﬀ (1680 Tokens for the assessment about the A
subjects’ bias and 105 for the guess about ¯ t) if they make the correct choice and a low payoﬀ
else.
2.2 Results Baseline Treatments
Treatment A conﬁrms that subjects are overconﬁdent. 60% of the A subjects overestimate
their number of correct answers and, moreover, they are overconﬁdent on average (we mea-
sure the bias by ¯ t − ¯ q): their bias is -1.1. According to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we
can reject the null-hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the individual values of q and t
has a median value of zero (p-value: 0.006) and thus say that they diﬀer signiﬁcantly. The
distribution of the values of t and q in Figure 1 illustrates this: the q-distribution is right
skewed, the t-distribution is left skewed.5
Do the B subjects know about this bias? The answer is no. Roughly 75% say that the A
subjects are correct and only 15% think that they are overconﬁdent. Also the B subjects’
average belief about the true number of correct answers of the A subjects points only to
some awareness of overconﬁdence: They guess that ¯ t is on average 0.2 units smaller than
¯ q (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.002, two-sided). This does not mirror the true degree of
overestimation. Both observations show that B subjects overestimate the accuracy of the A
subjects’ belief on average.
3 Extension I: Familiarity with the Task
Given that overconﬁdence is a phenomenon that is present in everyday’s life, the above
result is surprising. One possible explanation is that estimating the number of correct
questions is an unfamiliar task, in which B subjects have no further experience, and that
5Treatment A is not an outlier: In all other treatments, where subjects estimated their number of correct
answers, they overestimated it, where the percentage of subjects who overestimated it varies from 53 to 76
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Figure 1: Distribution of true and estimated number of correct answers in Treatment A.
this unfamiliarity causes the B subjects’ unawareness. To further investigate this issue, we
conduct several extensions of our baseline experiment. In these, we give B subjects small
pieces of information about the task: We let them answer the questions and estimate their
number of correct answers themselves, we use non-neutrally written instructions, or tricky
questions to which we show them the correct answers. Next to making B subjects more
familiar with the task, letting them answer the questions themselves, allows us to shed some
light on the reasons for their belief about others: Is there a relation between the own bias
and the belief about the bias of others?
3.1 Answer Questions Themselves: Treatment Q
The ﬁrst extension is Treatment Q, which is a combination of Treatments A and B: 17
subjects (“Q subject” or “he”) ﬁrst answer the same seven multiple-choice questions which
the A subjects answered and then estimate their number of correct answers. Afterwards, they
receive the same information about Treatment A as the B subjects did and state whether they
think that the A subjects are over-, underconﬁdent, or unbiased. By answering the questions
himself, a Q subject might not only get a better feeling for the diﬃculty of the questions
and whether the A subjects’ average guess is realistic, but he might also start to reason
better about the problem at hand (compare e.g. Croson, 2000). Our results show that this
is indeed the case: Subjects now recognize more often that others are overconﬁdent. 24% of
the subjects state that the A subjects overestimate their number of correct answers. While
this percentage is higher than the 15% in Treatment B, still the majority of 59% thinks that
7the A subjects are on average correct. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there
is no relation between the number of subjects in Treatments B and Q, who think that the
A subjects are unbiased or biased, according to a Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.234, one-sided).
Thus, the greater familiarity makes subjects more often recognize that overconﬁdence is a
problem in the population, but still they are not fully aware of it.
By letting the Q subjects complete the task of the A subjects, we do not only increase their
familiarity with the task, but we can also analyze whether there is a relation between a
subject’s own bias and the belief about the bias of others. To investigate this issue, we plot
in Figure 2 three cumulative distribution functions of Q subjects’ biases – one function for Q
subjects who think that A subjects are unbiased/overconﬁdent/underconﬁdent. We see that
the cumulative distribution function of those subjects, who think that the A subjects are
on average correct, is always below the other two functions – indicating that they have less
extreme overconﬁdence biases.6 Q subjects who think that others are underconﬁdent are in
fact most overconﬁdent: They overestimate their number of correct answers by 3 on average.
A possible explanation behind this result is the presence of a self-correction mechanism:
Those Q subjects, who think others underestimate their number of correct answers may
also think that they themselves underestimate it – thus, adjusting their estimate about the
own number of correct answers, q, upwards – leading in fact to a greater overestimation.
In contrast, subjects who think that others overestimate it, adjust their belief downwards,
leading more often to correct/better choices. We do not observe in this treatment that
subjects, who think that others are overconﬁdent, are more biased (underconﬁdent) than
those, who think that others are unbiased – something we observe, however, in the treatment
described in the following section, where the familiarity with the task is further increased.
3.2 Answer Questions Themselves, Non-Neutral Wording, Tricky
Questions: Treatment W
We have seen in Section 3.1 that some familiarity with the task helps to recognize that
others are biased, but does not make subjects fully aware of it. In Treatment W, we increase
the subjects’ (“W subject” or “he”) familiarity with the task further by using non-neutral
wording in the instructions. We do so for two diﬀerent types of questions and randomly
select which part is paid to avoid hedging.
6If we test the biases of those Q subjects, who think others are biased (either overconﬁdent or under-










































Belief Others Overestimate Belief Others Correct
Belief Others Underestimate
Figure 2: Q subject’s bias given belief about the bias in A subjects’ self-assessment. A
negative bias refers to overconﬁdence and a positive bias to underconﬁdence.
3.2.1 Diﬃcult Questions
In the ﬁrst stage of Treatment W, we repeat Treatment Q, but the instructions use a non-
neutral language. We explicitly asked the 19 W subjects “How many questions do you think
you have correct?”, “Do you think that others over-, underestimate their number of correct
questions or estimate it correctly?” and “How many questions do you think the others
answered on average correctly?” (i.e. the choice of the number, which we added compared
to Treatment Q).
Our ﬁrst observation is that the greater familiarity increases the awareness about the bias of
others: In Treatment W, only 42% of subjects believe that the A subjects are unbiased, while
32% think that they are overconﬁdent. Thus, the information that the non-neutral wording
of the instructions provides leads to the insight that the A subjects are biased. Compared
to Treatment B, a Fisher’s exact test (p=0.038, one-sided) indicates that the percentage
of subjects who think that others are biased (unbiased) increases (decreases). The wording
does not, however, lead to the insight that A subjects are necessarily overconﬁdent as roughly
the same number of W subjects thinks that the A subjects are over- or underconﬁdent (32%
versus 26% ). The words “overestimate” and “underestimate” pop up in the instructions in
the same proportion – making people think about problems of biased estimates. But reading
these words did not animate subjects to ponder whether over-, or understimation is more
likely a problem.
As in Section 3.1, we can analyze the relation between a subject’s own bias and the subject’s
9belief about the bias of others. Compared to the results in Treatment Q, a self-correction
mechanism now explains the results perfectly: Those subjects saying that the A subjects
underestimate their number of correct answers, overestimate their own number by 1.2 on
average. They adjust their belief too much upwards and end up being most heavily over-
conﬁdent. Those subjects saying that the A subjects are roughly correct, overestimate their
own number by 0.75 on average. They do not recognize the bias of others, do not adjust the
own belief, and therefore, end up being overconﬁdent. And ﬁnally those, who say that the
A subjects are overconﬁdent, are in fact underconﬁdent with a bias of 0.5, they adjust their
own belief too much downwards.7
In addition to the relation between the own bias and the belief about the bias of others,
we can analyze the relation between the belief about one’s own number of correct answers
and the exact belief about the A subjects’ true number of correct answers (the guess z).
Figure 3 shows that W subjects with lower beliefs q (up to 3) guess on average that the
A subjects’ true number of correct answers is lower than ¯ q = 3.4, whereas subjects with
higher beliefs (from 4 on) estimate that the A subjects’ true number of correct answers is
larger than 3.4. Thus, W subjects adjust their belief about the A subjects in the direction
of their own belief. The result is supported by the observation that the estimates q and z
are positively correlated (Spearman rank-order correlation coeﬃcient 0.737, p = 0.0002). A
false consensus eﬀect (Mullen et al., 1985) can explain the observed behavior. People who
are prone to a false consensus eﬀect tend to overestimate the degree to which, for example,
their own behavior or beliefs are shared by other people. This eﬀect implies that subjects
overestimate the frequency with which their own estimate q is present in the population.
Up to now, we have seen that subjects tend to overestimate the own number of correct an-
swers as well as the accuracy of other subjects’ beliefs. These observations raise the question
whether subjects have the same bias when evaluating themselves and when evaluating the A
subjects. In a study by Baker and Emery (1993), individuals have extremely optimistic ex-
pectations assessing the likelihood that they get divorced themselves while they know quite
accurately the likelihood of divorces in the population (about 50 percent of U.S. couples
who marry). This ﬁnding suggests that people may be better at detecting “biases” of other
people than biases of themselves since no self-image concerns are involved when evaluating
others. This is consistent with our data: On average, the own bias is about 0.26 larger in
absolute terms (it is more negative) than the bias in assessing the others’ average number
of correct answers t (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.015). Thus, a driving force behind
overconﬁdence can be a kind of self-impression motive.
7The estimate q of those subjects, who say that others are overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent), is signiﬁcantly
smaller than the estimate q of those, who say that others are unbiased (according to Mann-Whitney U tests






q=0 q=1 q=2 q=3 q=4 q=5 q=6 q=7























Ws' Average Belief z about As'  t  As' Average Belief q about Own t
Figure 3: Average belief z about the A subjects ¯ t given the belief q of a W subject.
3.2.2 Tricky Questions
The second stage of Treatment W is analogue to the ﬁrst, except that the W subjects answered
diﬀerent multiple-choice questions. Therefore, we also confronted them with a diﬀerent
reference treatment (Treatment AT) in this stage. In addition, we showed them the correct
answers to the questions after they answered them and assessed their own number of correct
answers, but before evaluating the AT subjects. Treatment AT is exactly like Treatment A,
but 20 new subjects answer tricky multiple-choice questions instead of diﬃcult ones. These
questions look very simple (as one answer seems to be the correct one), but are in fact not.
Thus, subjects are quite certain that they choose the right answer, but actually select the
wrong one. Showing the correct answers to these questions, therefore should help subjects
to recognize that the others overestimate their number of correct answers.
Unsurprisingly, the tricky questions lead to more pronounced overestimation: The average
diﬀerence between the estimated and true number of correct answers is now 3.4 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p=0.000).8 More importantly, W subjects now recognize this problem.
Almost all (91%) say that AT subjects overestimate their number of correct answers. They
still do, however, not fully recognize to which extent overestimation is a problem. They
think that the true number of correct answers ¯ t of the AT subjects is around 2.9, whereas it
8We discuss the selection of questions and whether one can say that subjects are “more overconﬁdent”
with tricky questions in Section 6.
11is indeed only 1.2 and the AT subjects believe it is 4.6.9 Moreover, their guess is not much
smaller than their guess for the A subjects – who answered the diﬃcult and not the tricky
questions – which is 3.4.
4 Extension II: Facing a Single Subject (Treatment S)
So far, we investigated whether subjects know about the bias of the group of A subjects with
the result that a majority does not. We have seen that greater familiarity only alleviates
this ignorance. In real world situations, often not the bias of a group, but the one of a single
individual matters (e.g. the bias of one’s manager or of one’s opponent in a tournament).
In the following, we want to ask whether subjects know that a single A subject can make a
mistake when estimating her number of correct answers and whether they think that this
mistake is just random or caused by a bias.
4.1 Experimental Design
Treatment S is like Treatment Q, except that subjects (“S subjects”) now state beliefs about
a single A subject and not the complete group of A subjects. Subjects additionally choose the
number that mirrors their belief about another subject’s true number of correct answers t. To
elicit beliefs about a single A subject, we implemented the strategy method: 20 subjects state
for every possible estimate q ∈ {0,1,...,7} of an A subject whether they think she is under-,
overconﬁdent or unbiased (strictly speaking: makes mistakes or not). For the numbers 0
and 7 on the boundary, subjects only choose between the two appropriate possibilities. In
case he thinks the respective A subject is under- or overconﬁdent, he has to choose a number
z ∈ {0,1,...7}, z 6= q, that mirrors his belief about her true number of correct answers. A
subject in Treatment S was not paid for all his decisions, but for his decision when facing
the particular estimate q of a randomly selected A subject. When making their decisions, S
subjects did not know which decision is paid.
4.2 Results Treatment S
The results of Treatment S conﬁrm that the S subjects are aware that single A subjects
make mistakes when estimating their number of correct answers: No S subject states for all
possible estimates q of an A subject that she makes the correct choice. For each value of an
A subject’s belief q, 50 – 95 percent of S subjects state that the A subject is wrong.
We cannot directly conclude from the above observations that S subjects think single A
subjects are biased or just make a random mistake. To investigate this issue, we compare the
9A binomial test indicates that the subjects’ guesses are signiﬁcantly smaller than the AT subjects’ average
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Average Difference of Beliefs in Treatment S
Average Predicted Difference for Belief "Each Subject is Unbiased"
Figure 4: Average value of the diﬀerence between the S subject’s belief z about an A subject’s
t for each possible belief q of an A subject.
average choice of subjects in Treatment S with the predicted choice that would be consistent
with S subjects thinking that an A subject is unbiased. For this, we have to specify which
values of t can be compatible with a speciﬁc estimate q of an A subject given the assumption
that she is unbiased. We assume that the distribution of the mistake an unbiased A subject
makes is symmetric around zero and uniform. This implies that e.g. an A subject, who states
q = 1 could actually have a t ∈ {1,2,3,4}.10 In expectation, she thus has 2.5 correct – since
all four possibilities are equally likely. Since 2.5 is larger than her stated belief of 1, she
underestimates her number of correct answers. We plot the predicted choices of an S subject
for all possible beliefs of an A subject in Figure 4 (the dashed line). Figure 4 also shows the
average actual choices of the S subjects. One sees that the actual choices are close to the
ones predicted for unbiased A subjects (especially for low stated beliefs). Hence, S subjects
consider the mistakes they identify as random and do – as for the average of subjects – not
think that a single subject has a bias.
In Section 3.2, we already analyzed the relation between a subject’s own bias and his exact
belief about the average number of correct answers of a group of other subjects. Now, we
want to investigate the relation between a subject’s own bias and his belief about the number
of correct answers of a single other subject. For this we conduct a standard OLS regression.
10The drawback of this approach is that the precision of an A subject that states extreme beliefs q is higher
– for example, someone who says “I answered seven questions correctly” is always right. To circumvent this,
one can deﬁne unbiasedness such that the expected value of the mistake not for every single subject, but for
the population, is zero. The results we show diﬀer, however, only slightly if we use this assumption instead.
13We regress the estimates z on the own belief q, the own number of correct answers t, and
the belief qA an A subject has about herself, yielding (p-values are in brackets below the
coeﬃcients, R2 = 0.3438):
ˆ z = 0.161q + 0.513t + 0.633qA + 0.633.
(0.044) (0.00) (0.00) (0.106)
Thus, all three variables have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the guess about other
subjects. Clearly, this guess is related to the belief of an A subject – as this is the information
an S subject receives. Yet, also the belief about himself inﬂuences his guess. As in Section
3.2, the latter hints at a false consensus eﬀect. To further investigate this, we distinguish
between similar and non-similar individuals: A similar A subject has exactly the same belief
q about her number of correct answers than an S subject has about his number of correct
answers. We observe that the average distance between the estimate z for a similar subject
and this subject’s q is 0.75. But for non-similar subjects it is 1.87 (according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, p < 0.02). Moreover, the belief of an S subject
about a similar A subject and this A subject’s own belief are positively correlated (Spearman
rank-order correlation coeﬃcient: 0.59, p = 0.003). These observations together indicate
that a subject thinks that a similar subject is rather correct with her self-assessment. For
non-similar individuals, there is no correlation (Spearman rank-order correlation coeﬃcient:
-0.089, p = 0.296).11 Thus, for a non-similar individual, the own belief is not crucial for
one’s estimate.
A second implication of these observations is that a similar subject is considered to be more
likely correct than are non-similar subjects: The “adjustment” of a similar A subject’s belief
about herself is smaller than of non-similar ones (see above), and there is no adjustment at
all for similar A subjects in 60 percent of the observations, whereas for non-similar subjects
this is only true for 22 percent. Even more remarkably, subjects also think that similar A
subjects are likely to be correct if these A subjects hold “extreme” beliefs, for which most
other subjects say that this extreme belief must be mistaken.12
5 Extension III: Relative Bias
In many strategic interactions, it is not only important to know whether other subjects are
biased, but also to know about the relation between the own bias and the bias of others:
Who is more likely to be correct or biased – the other subjects or oneself? We address this
issue in the third extension.
11Moreover, if we do the above regression again, but only for the non-similar individuals, the own belief is
no longer signiﬁcant.
12For A subjects that are not similar and who have beliefs q ∈ {0,4,5,6,7}, the distances between q and
the estimate z of an S subject are signiﬁcantly larger than they are for similar A subjects (p ≤ 0.02).
14Alternative I Alternative II
q = t and |¯ q − ¯ t| < 0.5 800 800
q = t and |¯ q − ¯ t| > 0.5 500 300
q 6= t and |¯ q − ¯ t| < 0.5 300 500
q 6= t and |¯ q − ¯ t| > 0.5 210 210
Table 3: Payoﬀs to elicit beliefs about relative biases.
q = t (q 6= t) refers to the self-assessment of a subject in Treatment Q or S, respectively,
while |¯ q − ¯ t| ≷ 0.5 refers to the average self-assessment of the A subjects. In Treatment S,
subjects evaluate a single A subjects and not the group average, thus, |¯ q −¯ t| ≷ 0.5 has to be
replaced by q = t and q 6= t, respectively.
5.1 Experimental Design
To examine the aforementioned question, we include an additional task in Treatments Q, S
and W. In Treatment W, we explicitly ask subjects whether they think that “I and others
made the correct choice” (or “both are wrong”, “others right and I am wrong”, “others
wrong and I am right”). If subjects are right with their statement, they receive 400 Tokens,
otherwise 50. Hence, we can see from a subject’s choice in Treatment W whether he thinks
that he is rather biased himself than are the others or whether he thinks both are equally
likely (un-)biased.
In order to elicit such beliefs in Treatments Q and S, subjects choose between two alternatives
(I and II), whose payoﬀs for the four possible events are shown in Table 3. Payoﬀs of the two
alternatives only diﬀer for the event that a subject is correct himself, while the A subjects are
wrong (on average), or when the subject is wrong but the A subjects are correct (on average).
In case that both are correct or both are wrong the two alternatives lead to identical payoﬀs.
Combining the choice between these two alternatives with the statement whether a subject
thinks that A subjects are under-, overconﬁdent or unbiased one can, nevertheless, conclude
whether he thinks that both make the right or wrong decision or only one is wrong while
the other one is right.
5.2 Results
Figure 5 shows the percentage of subjects in Treatments Q and W (for the diﬃcult questions)
thinking that oneself does not make a mistake and the A subjects are biased, that oneself and
the A subjects are correct, that oneself makes a mistake while the A subjects are unbiased
or that both are wrong. In both treatments, it is the largest group of subjects that thinks
it is more likely that they do not make a mistake themselves, while the others are biased.
About two thirds of the subjects think that they and the others or only they themselves
15are unbiased. Thus, familiarity – the framing – does not make subjects recognize that
overestimation is a problem for themselves.
The result is striking in the following respect: If one thinks that the population is unbiased
on average, one should rather state that the others are correct because it is more likely that
oneself – as a single subject – is wrong than the whole population (as random mistakes cancel
out for the population but not for a single subject). As we have seen in Section 4, subjects
are aware that single subjects make random mistakes. Thus, subjects do not believe that
they – compared to others – make a mistake at all. This indicates a strong better-than-
average eﬀect (or self-serving bias): Individuals do not only think that they have better
relative abilities (as psychologist observe), but also that they are better in judging their own
ability than are others in this task (even if for others random mistakes cancel out). This
strong self-serving bias can also be the driving force behind the observation that familiarity
does not help subjects to recognize that they are biased themselves: Subjects might simply
ignore the information included in the framing that indicated that they – and not only the
others – might be wrong.
When subjects face a single A subject in Treatment S, the result is similar: A majority of
subjects states that rather they are correct themselves than is a single A subject, i.e. they
choose Alternative I. We plot the percentages of S subjects’ choices of Alternatives I and II
for every single belief of an A subject in Figure 6. More striking in Treatment S, however,
is the observation that for low stated beliefs q of an A subject, S subjects tend even more to
Alternative I (indicating that they rather think they are correct themselves) than for high
beliefs of an A subject.13 Thus, S subjects are more conﬁdent in those subjects who appear
to be good types (i.e. who state a high belief about themselves).
Earlier, we analyzed the relation between a subject’s own bias and the belief about the bias
of others. We discussed, how a self-correction mechanism explains the results. Now, we can
look at the relation between a subject’s own bias and the belief about the relative bias. The
analysis of the relation provides again evidence that subjects try to correct their choices
if they are aware of biases: In Treatment Q, subjects who choose Alternative I – which
indicates that they think they are rather correct themselves – have a signiﬁcantly stronger
bias than those choosing Alternative II (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.007). The pattern for
Treatment W is similar. Here, those who say that they are more likely correct than are the
A subjects have on average a higher bias.
13According to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the medians of the number of subjects choosing Alternative
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Figure 5: Beliefs about relative biases. Treatment W1 refers to the part of Treatment W
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Figure 6: Average choice of alternatives I and II in Treatment S. Alternative I/ Alternative
II indicates that a subject thinks it is rather correct himself/rather the others are correct.
176 Discussion
In the following, we discuss the selection of questions in our experiment, which is a possible
drawback, the procedure to measure the overconﬁdence bias, and applications of our results
to organizations and markets.
6.1 Choice of Questions
The issue that the type of questions matters for overconﬁdence has been intensively inves-
tigated in the literature with diﬀerent results. A well-known result is the hard-easy eﬀect.
Lichtenstein and Fischhoﬀ (1977), for instance, show that with easy questions overconﬁ-
dence vanishes and even turns into underconﬁdence. Gigerenzer (1993) claims that the type
of questions does not matter, whereas it matters whether questions are randomly selected or
not. If they were selected randomly, overconﬁdence would vanish. Among others, Brenner
et al. (1996) show that this is not true.
What is the implication of this discussion for our experiment? As we have seen overestima-
tion is more pronounced with the tricky questions. Obviously, this is caused by the questions
and thus, one cannot claim that subjects have a stronger bias with the tricky questions. In
the text, we did not deepen this discussion as our focus is not whether subjects are more or
less overconﬁdent with tricky questions. Instead, we use the tricky questions just as a means
to be able to provide subjects with a strong signal (by showing them the correct answers)
that others might be wrong with their assessment. Thus, in this respect the selection of
question discussion has no implication for our experiment.
From another perspective, however, the discussion matters. If Gigerenzer (1993) is right with
his critique, then the B, Q, W and S subjects’ beliefs about how we selected the questions
are important: Do they think we selected them in a special way or randomly? Thinking that
we randomly selected the questions could cause their belief that others are unbiased (being
aware that overconﬁdence vanishes in case of a random selection of questions). A study by
Frederick (2005) (which deals, however, with a diﬀerent topic than ours) makes clear that
this can be an issue. In this study, subjects face questions that induce “intuitive mistakes”.
This means that the answer that comes ﬁrst to ones mind is wrong. Those subjects, who
correctly answered the questions, recognized that the questions were not as easy as they
looked like. Hence, the latter subjects think more often that others are wrong than do those
who did not answer the questions correctly. However, such reasoning is harder with our
questions as they do not induce intuitive mistakes: As we have seen, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between Treatments B and Q – showing that when subjects think longer about
the questions this does not make them signiﬁcantly more often recognize that others are
biased. Moreover, the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Treatments B and W speak against the
explanation that the subjects’ beliefs about the rationality of others is shaped by their be-
18lief about how we selected the questions: If subjects believed that we selected the questions
randomly and this causes unbiasedness, we should see no diﬀerence between these treatments.
6.2 Overconﬁdence
The literature applies several deﬁnitions of overconﬁdence. On the one hand, one can deﬁne
overconﬁdence about own knowledge or ability or one can deﬁne it as being too optimistic
regarding the own performance (“optimistic overconﬁdence”), which does not necessarily
depend on own knowledge. On the other hand, overconﬁdence can refer to absolute abilities
as well as to relative abilities, i.e. people make assessments either regarding their own ability
or regarding their ability compared to other people’s abilities (like estimating their rank or
percentile in a distribution). In our experiment, we deal with overconﬁdence about the own
absolute ability. We choose this for the following two reasons. First, optimistic overconﬁ-
dence would have been harder to measure in the laboratory. Second, we choose absolute and
not relative abilities because if people were even not aware of this simple bias, the awareness
of other notions of overconﬁdence (like relative biases) is even less likely.
Besides several deﬁnitions of overconﬁdence, there are also diﬀerent ways to measure over-
conﬁdence. Much of the evidence for overconﬁdence comes from calibration studies by psy-
chologists, in which subjects make probability judgements, e.g., about their answer to a
question being correct. In contrast, we let people make a point estimation. First, we think
that this is easier to understand than a calibration task (especially for the subjects in Treat-
ments B, Q, W and S). Second, and more importantly, with this task, we can distinguish
between random mistakes and real biases.
6.3 Applications and Directions for Future Research
The ﬁnding by psychologists that people are overconﬁdent inspired economists to include
such a bias also in their models: what is the optimal incentive contract for an overconﬁdent
agent (de la Rosa, 2007; Santos-Pinto, 2007a), how do such agents behave in tournaments
(Santos-Pinto, 2007b) and team production (Gervais and Goldstein, 2004), or how do they
compete in an oligopolistic market (Eichberger et al., 2007; Englmaier, 2004). All these mod-
els involve strategic interactions – something we have not considered in our experiment. The
reason for this design is simple: Without strategic interaction, subjects’ decisions are fully
driven by their belief about the bias of others and not by strategic considerations. While
adding strategic interaction makes this impossible, it adds other interesting questions: Do
subjects exploit the bias of others strategically (given they know their opponents are biased),
or do they violate the “no agree to disagree assumption” (I think I am better than you, you
think you are better than me).
19Furthermore, our results gave quite pessimistic predictions regarding the knowledge about
other people’s (e.g. an opponents’) bias – an assumption that is, however, met in the theo-
retical models above. Thus, it seems an important direction for future research to examine
whether our results would be replicated in a strategic context.
In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we have seen the presence of a self-correction mechanism: e.g., those
subjects, who state that others are overconﬁdent, are underconﬁdent themselves. This indi-
cates that at least some people are to some extent aware that they have a bias – for which
they try to correct (as they might not know the size of their bias, they might overreact).
Our experimental design does not allow us to examine what people really know about their
own bias, which is, however, an interesting question for future research.
Finally, it seems important to examine further the implications of un-/awareness of other
people’s bias for organizations and markets. For example, in ﬁrms, overconﬁdent managers
can have a positive (Goel and Thakor, 2005) or negative (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2006;
Malmendier et al., 2006) impact on the ﬁrm’s performance depending on the dimension one
considers. Thus, the question arises, whether managers are selected systematically with re-
spect to their overconﬁdence bias or whether shareholders are simply not aware of this bias
and its possible positive or negative implications for the ﬁrm.
Another area where the knowledge about other people’s bias matters are university admis-
sions or career centers. It is, for example, well-known that men are more overconﬁdent than
women (see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001). In many countries signiﬁcantly less women hold
a university degree than men and overestimation of abilities can be one explanation for this
observation. Hence, an interesting issue is whether people responsible for university admis-
sions and teachers are aware of the fact that men are more overconﬁdent and whether they
try to correct for it.
7 Conclusion
Overconﬁdence is an everyday life phenomenon: People overestimate their driving abili-
ties, students their scores in exams or their position in the distribution or ranking, couples
the likelihood of not getting divorced, and portfolio managers their prediction abilities. As
overconﬁdence is such a common characteristic of people’s behavior and is observed so fre-
quently in real life, one expects that people are also aware of this bias. While we conﬁrm
that overestimation of the own ability is a prominent phenomenon, we nevertheless ﬁnd that
a majority of subjects does not think or know that others have a bias. We examine some
explanations for this behavior: the lack of familiarity with the task, the distinction between
real biases and random mistakes, and the relation between the belief about one’s own ability
20and bias and the belief about other people’s biases. Concerning familiarity, we observe that
making individuals more familiar with the task increases the awareness, but still they do
not recognize the full extent of the overconﬁdence bias. A better explanation might thus be
that subjects are well aware that others make mistakes when evaluating their ability – they
think, however, that these mistakes cancel out on average, i.e. are random. Finally, we saw
that also the belief about oneself matters for the belief about others: We discussed how the
results are driven by a better-than-average eﬀect (i.e. a self-serving bias), a self-correction
mechanism and a false consensus eﬀect.
21Appendix
We show that the payoﬀs in our experiment induce a subject that maximizes some increasing
utility function u(·) to choose the alternative which he thinks is most likely to be correct. Be-
fore we show this, note that all decision problems in our experiment have the same structure:
A subject has the choice between several alternatives (J = {2,3,4,8,70}). For example, a
subject has eight alternatives for the statement how many questions she thinks she answered
correctly. If a subject makes the “right” choice (e.g., she states the right number of correctly
answered questions), she receives a high payoﬀ and if her choice is not correct, she receives
a low payoﬀ.
An individual might be uncertain which alternative is true, and hence forms beliefs about
the probabilities of the diﬀerent alternatives being true. To show that a subject chooses the
alternative on which she puts the largest probability to be the correct one, we ﬁrst deﬁne
beliefs and strategies of a subject. We let µj be the individual’s belief that alternative j is
true j ∈ {0,...J} with
PJ
j µj = 1. Given (with some abuse of notation) a pure strategy
j ∈ J = {0,...J} of an individual, a mixed strategy, σ : J → [0,1], assigns to each pure
strategy j a probability σj ≥ 0 with which j is played where
P
j σj = 1. Further, we denote
by c the high payoﬀ (525, 1680, 105, 400, 500 Tokens) and by c−κ the low one (20, 30, 315,
50, 300 Tokens).14 We assume, without loss of generality, that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µJ.
Then, one can show the following:
Proposition 1 Unless µ1 = µ2, an individual plays a pure strategy. More precisely, the
individual sets σ1 = 1 if µ1 > µj ∀j 6= 1. If µ1 = ... = µn > µn+1 ≥ ... ≥ µJ with
J ≥ n ≥ 2, then any σ with σ1 + ... + σn = 1 can be optimal.
This result implies that a mixed strategy is not optimal as long as an individual that is
uncertain about the right action attaches a higher probability to one possible action than to
all other actions.
Since all the decision problems in our experiment have this structure, we can apply this
proposition to all of them.
Proof.
The subjectively expected utility of an individual from strategy σ is
µ1[σ1u(c) + σ2u(c − κ) + ... + σJu(c − κ)] + µ2[σ1u(c − κ) + σ2u(c) + ... + σJu(c − κ)]
+... + µJ[σ1u(c − κ) + σ2u(c − κ)...σJu(c)].
14So called “probability matching” (see e.g. Shanks et al., 2002) could occur in our decision problem.
Shanks et al. (2002) show that this anomaly occurs less often in case ﬁnancial incentives are provided. Thus,






































Suppose now that subjects never put the same probability on alternatives. Without loss of gener-
ality µ1 > µ2 > ... > µJ. The expected utility under a strategy that sets σ1 = 1 would be




Compare this to a strategy σ0 that puts some positive weight on other alternatives (i.e. σ0
1 < 1).
This means, we subtract (1) from (2), where we, however, replace all σj by σ0































As long as this diﬀerence is positive, the strategy that sets σ1 = 1 is optimal. Consider term (A)
using that σ0




























This is strictly larger than zero since µ1 > µ2 > ... > µJ. The smallest value it can take is zero if






































This term is (strictly) negative (the term equals zero if µ1 = µ2 = ... = µJ), but the absolute value
is the same for the term (A) and (B). Since the ﬁrst is weighted by u(c) > u(c − κ), subjectively
expected utility from the strategy setting σ1 = 1 is larger than from σ0 and hence, this is the
optimal strategy.
It is easy to see that this result also holds true for µ1 > µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µJ, since σ0
1 < 1. If, however,
µ1 = ... = µn > µn+1 ≥ ... ≥ µJ with J ≥ n ≥ 2, then any σ with σ1 + ... + σn = 1 can be










23as µ1 = µn. Consider a strategy σ0 that sets σ0




j = 1. Then term (A) and term (B) would be both equal to zero under this strategy
σ0. Hence, the strategy setting σ1 = 1 yields the same expected payoﬀ than σ0. Thus, any strategy
that sets σ1 + ... + σn = 1 can be optimal.
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